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Abstract—Secure routing protocols are proposed for the ve-
hicular ad hoc networks. The protocols integrate the security
authentication process with the Location-Aided Routing (LAR)
protocol to support Wi-Fi Direct communications between the
vehicles. The methods are robust against various security threats.
The security authentication process adopts a modified Diffie-
Hellman key agreement protocol. The Diffie-Hellman protocol is
used with a short authentication string (SAS)-based key agree-
ment over Wi-Fi Direct out-of-band communication channels. It
protects the communication from any man-in-the-middle security
threats. In particular, the security process is integrated into two
LAR routing schemes, i.e., the request-zone LAR scheme and the
distance-based LAR scheme. We conduct extensive simulations
with different network parameters such as the vehicular node
density, the number of the malicious nodes, and the speed of
the nodes. Simulation results show that the proposed routing
protocols provide superior performance in secure data delivery
and average total packet delay. Also, the secure distance-based
LAR protocol outperforms the secure request-zone LAR protocol.
Index Terms—Vehicular ad hoc network, secure routing, Wi-Fi
direct, location-aided routing, security authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a class of mobile
ad hoc network (MANET), where a group of vehicles with
high mobility provide connectivity to each other [1]. The
intercommunication of the vehicular nodes can be through
a direct transmission from the source to the destination if
the destination is in the sources transmission range. It can
also go through the intermediate nodes if the destination is
outside the source’s transmission range [2]. The intelligent
transportation system (ITS) uses the VANET technology to
provide safety services to customers such as slow-down no-
tifications, collision warnings, emergency notifications, and
road enforcement [3]. A reliable intercommunication should
be established for the safety services, because a disconnection
may lead to a catastrophe [4].
In a MANET, different routing protocols are adopted to
provide reliable communications. These protocols have meth-
ods that are proactive (e.g., OLSR and DSDV), reactive (e.g.,
AODV and DSR), hybrid (e.g., ZRP), and hierarchical (e.g.,
CBRR and FSR) [5]–[8]. Although these methods are efficient
for MANETs, they do not perform well in VANETs. This is
because that the VANET does not follow a fixed topology
or a low-dynamic topology. When high-mobility vehicular
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nodes communicate with each other, the relative distances
change dramatically, and the connections are intermittent.
Therefore, the network topology is highly dynamic. It leads to
unreliable intercommunication with existing MANET routing
protocols. Also, the traffic restrictions such as intersections,
traffic lights, road patterns, and signal blocking objects de-
grade the reliability of the routes discovered by the MANET
routing protocols [9]. To overcome the limitations of MANET
routing protocols, the topology-independent routing protocols,
in particular, the position-based routing protocols such as
Location-Aided Routing (LAR), Greedy Perimeter Stateless
Routing (GPSR), and Greedy Perimeter Coordinator Routing
(GPCR) [10]–[13], should be adopted for VANETs. In the
proposed routing protocols, the physical locations of the
vehicular nodes are found with the GPS service [14]. The
position-based routing protocols provide a stable and reliable
route to the destination, where the positions of the nodes are
accurate through GPS service.
One of the common communication methods for the
VANET is the dedicated short range communication (DSRC)
that is based on the IEEE802.11p standard. It provides a
reliable communication link between two vehicles. However,
the DSRC technology has limitations in the cost of the
additional dedicated hardware, the low channel bandwidth (10
MHz), and the low data rate (6-27 Mbps) [15]. The Wi-Fi
Direct technology based on the IEEE 802.11n standard is
used to establish a device-to-device (D2D) connection without
the coordination of the access point [16]. It has been proven
with real-time experiments that the Wi-Fi is a successful
means of communication between vehicles in a VANET even
at very high speed (i.e., 120 mph) [17]. Compared with
DSRC, Wi-Fi Direct provides a channel bandwidth of 20
MHz, up to 250 Mbps data rates, and no additional hardware
cost. The proposed routing protocols work with Wi-Fi Direct
communication links to provide the required QoS requirements
of the real-time data flow in the VANET.
The VANET is subject to many security threats that in-
clude altering GPS information, position cheating, identifier
altering, snooping and spoofing, and man-in-the-middle at-
tack (MITMA) [18], [19]. Hacking is a serious problem in
the VANET due to information broadcasting, infrastructure-
less model, and high-dynamic topology changes [20], [21].
Accordingly, various secure routing protocols are proposed
for the VANET [22], [23]. The geographical secure path
routing (GSPR) protocol adds authentication and privacy to
the geographic path routing (GPR) protocol through sharing
geographic hashes to detect malicious nodes [24]. To deal with
false-position security threats, digital signature and plausibil-
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2ity checks are used in a vehicle-to-vehicle secure position-
based routing protocol [25]. Hash message authentication code
(HMAC) is integrated with the optimized link state routing
(OLSR) to generate the secure OLSR (SOLSR) routing pro-
tocol [26]. The protocol detects the snooping security threats
through the use of symmetric and public cryptographic key.
Integrity security service is provided for the VANET through
the secure ad hoc on-demand distance vector (SAODV) routing
protocol [27]. The hop count process is applied through the
use of a hash chain, while the digital signature is used for
authentication.
In this paper, we propose new routing protocols for the
VANET that integrate the LAR with the security authentication
process over Wi-Fi Direct data links between the vehicles.
The routing protocols include the request-zone LAR (RLAR)
scheme and the distance-based LAR (DLAR) scheme. The
security unit adopts the Diffie-Hellman protocol with a short
authentication string (SAS)-based key agreement over Wi-
Fi Direct out-of-band communication channels. The proposed
protocols protect the VANET from the security threats, espe-
cially the MITMA.
The key features of the proposed secure routing for the
VANET are as follows.
1) The use of Wi-Fi Direct technology for data communica-
tion between vehicle nodes, thus providing the VANET
with efficient node intercommunications.
2) The integration of the two LAR routing protocols with
a security-authentication unit to provide a secure route
in the VANET.
3) The integration of the Diffie-Hellman protocol with an
SAS-based key agreement to provide a high level of
security and make the VANET robust against threats
such as the MITMA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The RLAR
protocol is proposed in Section II. We describe the insecure
Wi-Fi Direct RLAR and present the secure Wi-Fi Direct
RLAR methods. The DLAR protocol is proposed in Sec-
tion III. We describe the insecure Wi-Fi Direct DLAR and
present the secure Wi-Fi Direct DLAR methods. With exten-
sive simulations, Section IV gives the performance evaluation
of the proposed routing protocols. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. REQUEST-ZONE LAR (RLAR) PROTOCOL
A. Expected Zone and Request Zone
Suppose that each of the vehicular network nodes has its
location information through the GPS service. The Expected
Zone is a region in which the source (S) node expects
the destination (D) node to be contained at some particular
time [28]. Assume that node S knows that node D is at location
L at time t0 and it travels at an average speed of v. From the
viewpoint of S, the expected zone of node D at time t1 is the
circular region of radius v(t1 − t0) centered at point L.
Node S knows its current location (Xs, Ys). It also knows
the location of node D at time t0, i.e., (Xd, Yd), and the
average speed v of D. Such information can be obtained by
the auto-reply messages from the nodes. Node S wants to
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Fig. 1. Request zone when Dist > R. Source node S is out of the expected
zone of destination node D.
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Fig. 2. Request zone when Dist ≤ R. Source node S is in the expected
zone of destination node D.
communicate with node D at time t1. Accordingly, node S
perceives the expected zone of node D at time t1 as a circular
region with radius R = v(t1 − t0) and centered at location
(Xd, Yd).
Node S evaluates the distance (Dist) between its location
(Xs, Ys) and node D’s location (Xd, Yd). With Dist, node
S defines the Request Zone for the route request. It is the
smallest rectangle that includes the current location of S and
the expected zone of D such that the sides of the rectangle
are parallel to the X and Y axes. Given Dist and R, there are
two situations:
(1) If Dist > R, node S is out of the expected zone of node
D. The request zone coordinates are shown in Fig. 1.
(2) If Dist ≤ R, node S is in the expected zone of node D.
The request zone coordinates are shown in Fig. 2.
B. RLAR with Wi-Fi Direct Communications
The LAR protocol depends on the nodes’ location informa-
tion to calculate the route from the source to the destination.
We propose the request-zone LAR (RLAR) approach that uses
the request zone information in routing.
In the RLAR protocol, Node S prepares the message for
node D that includes: (1) Source coordinates (Xs, Ys), (2)
The coordinates of the request zone (S, A, B, and C in Fig. 1)
3or (G, A, B, and C in Fig. 2), (3) Source and destination MAC
addresses (e.g., vehicle plate numbers or engine serial numbers
in a VANET), and (4) The position of S corresponding to the
request zone (e.g. inside or outside the request zone). Node S
floods the message to its neighbors with the Wi-Fi Direct links.
When a neighboring node B receives the message, it checks
whether its location (Xb, Yb) is within the request zone. If
node B is within the request zone, we have
Xs ≤ Xb ≤ (Xd +R) & Ys ≤ Yb ≤ (Yd +R)
(Xd −R) ≤ Xb ≤ (Xd +R) & Yd −R ≤ Yb ≤ Yd +R
If node B is within the request zone, it checks whether
the destination address is its address. If not, node B forwards
the message to its neighbors. If node B is the destination,
it generates an ACK message, i.e., a reply, and floods it. The
reply message contains information about the current time and
the destination node’s speed. Such information will be used
by the source node for defining the request zone for future
communication. If node B does not belong to the request zone,
it discards the message. Also, if a node receives the same
message from a different node, it discards it. This protects the
network from being congested.
Between any two vehicular nodes of the VANET, the Wi-Fi
Direct technology is used as a communication means. Fig. 3
shows the communication protocol between a pair of nodes
with Wi-Fi Direct. The first phase is the discovery process,
where the two nodes perform channel probing mechanism
with the probe request and probe response control signals.
In the second phase, the group owner is negotiated through
group-owner request, response, and confirmation. Once the
group owner is specified, it acts as an access point for the
connection. In the third phase, the Wi-Fi protected setup
(WPS) is initiated by the group owner using the extensible
authentication protocol signals such as EAPOL request and
EAPOL response. Finally, the address configuration phase is
initiated by the group owner by conducting the Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [16].
C. Secure RLAR with Wi-Fi Direct Communications
According to the proposed protocol, we assume the follow-
ing:
1) Any two trusted adjacent nodes belonging to the VANET
can initiate an out-of-band channel. This channel is a
trusted one such that it cannot be manipulated by the
attackers;
2) For generating a shared security key, the trusted nodes
that belong to the VANET use the Diffie-Hellman pro-
tocol with the common integer parameters such as the
prime modulus (m) and the base (b);
3) Each node Ni has its own private key (ri), which is
an integer not be exchanged. This key will be used to
generate the public key in the network;
4) Each node Ni has its unique identification (ID) that can
be considered as the MAC address in the network (e.g.,
the vehicle plate number);
5) Each node Ni can generate a k-bit random string (Ai).
These k bits will be used to generate the authentication
Device A Device B 
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Probe Response 
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Group-Owner Request 
Group-Owner Response 
Group-Owner Confirmation 
Group Owner 
  Negotiation 
EAPOL Auth. Request 
EAPOL Auth. Response WPS 
DHCP Discover 
DHCP Offer 
DHCP Request 
DHCP ACK 
     Address 
 Configuration 
Fig. 3. Communication protocol with Wi-Fi Direct.
string (Si) of the short authentication string (SAS)-based
key agreement protocol.
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement allows two vehicular
nodes with no prior knowledge of each other to jointly
establish a shared secret key [16]. The short authentication
string (SAS)-based key agreement protocol involves minimal
mutual authentication. It utilizes a cryptography commitment
scheme. An efficient construction of a commitment is achieved
by using a cryptographic hash function. Both nodes compute
a hash value of the obtained shared key and compare the hash
values via the secure out-of-band channel.
The source node S performs the Diffie-Hellman key agree-
ment protocol to generate its public key gs as
gs = b
rs mod m. (1)
The source node S then generates a message ms in the form
of the concatenation of its public key gs and the randomly
generated k-bit string As as
ms = gs‖As. (2)
In our proposed protocol, we use the commitment scheme of
the cryptography schemes. On the one hand, a node is commit-
ted to a value and keeps it hidden from others (commit phase).
On the other hand, it has the ability to unlock and reveal such
a value later (open phase). An efficient construction of the
commitment scheme can be achieved by using a cryptographic
hash function [29].
The source node S uses its private key rs with a crypto-
graphic hash function H to compute the commitment cs on
the concatenation ms as
cs = H(ms, rs). (3)
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Fig. 4. Security authentication model at source node S and node N.
The source node S then includes the following information in
the message that is sent to the destination: (1) The commitment
cs, (2) The source coordinates (Xs, Ys), (3) The request zone
coordinates (S A B C in Fig. 1) or (G A B C in Fig. 2), and
(4) Source and destination MAC addresses (IDs, IDd). The
source node S floods the message to its neighbors with Wi-Fi
Direct.
When a node N receives the message, it checks whether its
location (Xn, Yn) is within the request zone. If the node N
is not within the request zone, it discards the message. Oth-
erwise, it generates its own concatenation mn using formulas
that are similar to (1) and (2). Node N then sends mn to
the source node S (with the destination address IDs). Once
the source node S receives this message, it sends the open
parameter w to node N (with destination address IDn).
Before generating the shared security key, node S generates
the k-bit authentication string Ss as
Ss = As ⊕An (4)
where An is extracted from mn. Node N uses the open
parameter w to reveal the commitment cs and extracts the
k-bit string As from ms. Node N then generates the k-bit
authentication string Sn as
Sn = As ⊕An. (5)
Over the secure out-of-band channel, nodes S and N verify
whether the two authentication strings match (Ss = Sn?). The
overall security-authentication model at the two parties (source
node S and node N) is shown in Fig. 4.
If the two authentication strings do not match, the two
parties stop the process of generating the security keys, and
node N discards the message due to an MITMA. Therefore,
node N will not be in the secure route to the destination. The
source node S will use another adjacent node for the secure
route. If the two strings match, both nodes S and N generate
the shared key as
Key(s) = (gn)
rs mod m (6)
Key(n) = (gs)
rn mod m (7)
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Fig. 5. Six phases of the secure RLAR protocol.
where Key(s) and Key(n) are the shared security keys at node
S and node N, respectively. These two values are equal, i.e.,
Key(s) = Key(n). Note that, nodes S and N do not share
such keys. They generate them using the shared public keys
gs and gn.
Node N checks whether the destination address is its ad-
dress. If not, it forwards the message that includes the request
area coordinates to its neighbors. The same security authenti-
cation procedure repeats. If yes, node N generates an ACK
message (reply) and floods it. The reply message contains
information about the current time and the destination’s speed.
Such information will be used by the source for defining a new
request zone for future communication. If a node receives the
same message from a different node, it discards it. This process
protects the network from being congested. The phases of the
proposed secure RLAR routing protocol is shown in Fig. 5.
III. DISTANCE-BASED LAR (DLAR) PROTOCOL
A. DLAR with Wi-Fi Direct Communications
According to the above RLAR protocol, the route calcula-
tion is restricted by the boundaries of the requested zone. This
may cause successive route disconnection. To overcome this
limitation, we propose the distance-based LAR (DLAR) [28].
As shown in Fig. 6, the only restriction of the route calculation
is the node’s transmission range.
Assume the source node S knows the following information:
1) Its current location (Xs, Ys) via GPS;
2) The location (Xd, Yd) of the destination node D at some
time t0.
The route discovery is initiated by node S at time t1, where
t1 ≥ t0. The source node S calculates its distance from the
location (Xd, Yd), which is denoted as DISTs. It includes in
the message sent to node D (1) DISTs, (2) the coordinates
of node D (Xd, Yd), and (3) source and destination MAC
5S (Xs, Ys) 
N (Xn, Yn) 
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Fig. 6. Distance-based LAR (DLAR) scheme.
addresses, e.g., vehicle plate numbers. The source node S
floods the message to its neighbors through Wi-Fi direct.
When a node N receives the message, it calculates its
distance DISTn from the destination coordinates (Xd, Yd) and
compares DISTn with DISTs. If DISTn ≤ DISTs, node N
belongs to the route to the destination. Node N checks whether
itself is the destination node. If it is not, node N replaces
DISTs with DISTn in the message and forwards the message
to its neighbors. If node N is the destination node, it generates
an ACK message (reply) and floods it. This operation repeats
until the message is received by the destination node.
If a node receives the same message from a different node,
it discards it. This protects the network from being congested.
B. Secure DLAR with Wi-Fi Direct Communications
We assume the following when integrating the security
module in the DLAR.
1) The source node S knows its current location (Xs, Ys)
via GPS;
2) The source node S has knowledge about the location of
node D (Xd, Yd) at some time t0. Route discovery is
initiated by node S at time t1 with (t1 ≥ t0);
3) Each two trusted adjacent nodes in the VANET can
establish an out-of-band channel. This channel is trusted
and cannot be manipulated by the attackers;
4) The vehicular nodes use the Diffie-Hellman protocol to
generate a shared security key with the common integer
parameters such as the prime modulus (m) and the base
(b);
5) Each node Ni has its own private key (ri), which is an
integer not to be exchanged. This key will be used to
generate the public keys in the network;
6) Each node has its unique identification (ID) that can be
considered as the MAC address in the network (e.g., the
vehicle plate number);
7) Each node (Ni) can generate k-bit random string (Ai).
This k-bit string will be used to generate the authentica-
tion string (Si) of the short authentication string (SAS)-
based key agreement protocol.
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Fig. 7. Discovery of the man-in-the-middle attack (MITMA) security threat.
Accordingly, the source node S performs the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement protocol to generate its public key gs as in
(1). The source node S then makes the concatenation ms of
its public key gs and the randomly generated k-bit string As
as in (2). The source node S uses its private key rs with a
cryptographic hash function H to compute the commitment
cs on the concatenation ms as in (3).
For the secure DLAR, the source node S calculates its
distance from location (Xd, Yd) which is denoted by DISTs.
It includes the following information in the message that is
sent to the destination: (1) The commitment cs, (2) DISTs,
(3) the coordinates of the destination node D (Xd, Yd), and
(4) source and destination MAC addresses (IDs, IDd). The
source node floods the message to its neighbors using Wi-Fi
Direct.
When a node N receives the message, it calculates its
distance (DISTn) from the destination (Xd, Yd). Node N
determines whether itself should be in the route by comparing
DISTn with DISTs. If DISTn > DISTs, it reasons that
it is not in the route and discards the received message.
If DISTn ≤ DISTs, it knows it belongs to the route and
generates its concatenation mn.
Node N sends mn to the source node S with the destination
address IDs. Once the source S receives such message, it sends
the open parameter w to node N with the destination address
IDn.
Before generating the shared security key, node S and
node N generate the authentication string using (4) and (5),
respectively. Note that, node N uses the open parameter w to
reveal the commitment cs and extracts the k-bit string As from
ms.
Over the secure out-of-band channel, node S and node N
verify whether the two authentication strings match (Ss =
Sn?). If the strings do not match, the two parties stop the
process of generating the security keys. Node N discards the
message due to an MITMA. Node N is not in the secure
route to the destination, and node S will use another adjacent
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Fig. 8. Five phases of the secure DLAR protocol.
node for a secure route. If the two strings match, both node
S and node N generate the shared keys Key(s) and Key(n)
according to (6) and (7), respectively. These two values are
equal. Note that, the nodes do not share such keys. They
generate them using the shared public keys gs and gn.
Node N checks whether the destination address is its ad-
dress. If not, it forwards the message to its neighbors. The
message includes the destination’s coordinates (Xd, Yd) and
the distance DISTn instead of DISTs . The operation repeats
until reaching the destination. If node N is the destination
node, it generates an ACK message (reply) and floods it.
If a node receives the same message from a different node,
it discards the message. Such process protects the network
from being congested.
The overall process of discovering the MITMA is shown
in Fig. 7. The five phases of the proposed secure DLAR is
shown in Fig. 8.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Because the VANET environment is heterogeneous and dy-
namic, conventional network simulators are not sufficient for
analyzing the real-time performance of the proposed routing
protocols with security aspects. Besides, conventional network
simulators such as ns-3 do not include geographic routing in
their standard codes. They work well for wireless networks
and MANET, but not for the VANET under consideration. In
this research, we build our simulation models based on the
.Net platform with its inherited object-oriented capabilities to
analyze the performance of the proposed routing protocols.
A. Motion Model, System Parameters and Assumptions
In the simulations, we set the motion model, system param-
eters and assumptions as follows.
1) The number of vehicular nodes is set to be
10, 20, 30, . . . , N . In each simulation run, there are N/2
pairs of peer-to-peer communications, where the ith
node is the source node and the (i + N/2)th node is
the destination node, i = 1, 2, . . . , N/2.
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Fig. 9. Effect of node density on secure data delivery. 10% malicious nodes.
Node speed is 5 units/sec.
2) The sending rate λ is 50 packets per second, with each
node sending for 10 seconds (a total of 500 packets) to
the destination. The inter-arrival time is exponentially
distributed with a mean of 1/λ.
3) The initial locations of the nodes {(X,Y )} are randomly
chosen. The nodes move continuously with velocity v
that is uniformly distributed in [2, 40] units/sec. The
nodes move in a square region of [1000 units × 1000
units], where the direction of each node’s movement is
random.
4) Each node randomly changes its direction after traveling
a distance of d that is exponentially distributed with
a mean of 25 units. When a node touches the region
boundaries, it will “bounce back” and travel the remain-
ing distance in the opposite direction.
5) Transmission range for each node is set to be 200 units.
6) For each simulation, the Diffie-Hellman security integer
parameters, i.e., modulus m and base b, are randomly
chosen and common to all the nodes. The private key r
is randomly chosen for each individual node, and the k-
bit string A is randomly generated by each node, where
k = 10.
B. Node Density Effect
We study the performance of the proposed secure routing
protocols regarding secure data delivery and average total
packet delay on the node density. The number of nodes in
the VANET region is chosen as N = 10, 20, 30, . . . , 100.
The nodes’ speed is set to be 5 units/sec. The percentage of
malicious nodes that cause an MITMA is 10%.
Fig. 9 shows the percentage of secure data delivery versus
the number of nodes. Integrating the security module to the
standard LAR protocol enhances the delivery of the data
packets at the destination nodes. This is because the chances
of dropping a packet due to the MITMA are reduced. Of
the two secure routing protocols, the simulation results show
that the secure DLAR protocol outperforms the secure RLAR
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Fig. 10. Effect of node density on average total packet delay. 10% malicious
nodes. Node speed is 5 units/sec.
protocol regarding secure data delivery. This is because the
secure DLAR is only limited by the transmission ranges of
the nodes whereas the secure RLAR is restricted by both the
transmission ranges and the defined expected zones. Accord-
ingly, the secure DLAR experiences fewer disconnections of
the routes hence higher data delivery percentage.
Fig. 10 shows the average total packet delay versus the
number of nodes. The average total packet delay reflects the
efficiency of finding a route from the source to the destination
with the routing protocol. The simulation results show that the
proposed secure routing protocols have a tradeoff of larger de-
lays compared with the non-secure protocols. This is because
the secure routing protocols have additional security associ-
ation phases. Of the two proposed secure routing protocols,
secure DLAR outperforms the secure RLAR regarding average
total packet delay. Without the expected zone restriction, the
secure DLAR experiences fewer route disconnections.
To clarify the results, the data are analyzed in the following
tables. Table I and Table II show the enhancement of the data
delivery when integrating the security module in the LAR
protocol. It is revealed that the secure DLAR improves the
data delivery by an average of 46.2% over the non-secure
DLAR and the secure RLAR improves by an average of 49.6%
over the non-secure RLAR. Table III and Table IV compare
the secure DLAR with the secure RLAR. It is revealed that
the secure DLAR enhances the data delivery by an average
of 9.14% and reduces the average total packet delay by an
average of 17.48% over the secure RLAR.
C. Security Threat Effect
We study the effect of the number of malicious nodes,
particularly those cause the MITMA, on both data delivery
and packet delay. The number of malicious nodes is set to be
2, 4, 6, . . . , 12. The number of vehicular nodes is fixed at 40,
and the nodes’ speed is 5 units/sec.
Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show that, with the secure routing
protocol, a large number of malicious nodes has a negative
effect on the VANET in reduced secure data delivery and
increased average total packet delay. The secure DLAR out-
TABLE I
DELIVERY (DLAR VS. SDLAR)
# of Nodes Delivery (DLAR) Delivery (SDLAR) Enhancement
10 52 82 57.7%
20 56 86 53.6%
30 58 88 51.7%
40 63 92 46%
50 65 94 44.6%
60 68 96 41.2%
70 70 98 40%
80 70 99 41.4%
90 70 100 42.9%
100 70 100 42.9%
Avg.= 46.2%
TABLE II
DELIVERY (RLAR VS. SRLAR)
# of Nodes Delivery (RLAR) Delivery (SRLAR) Enhancement
10 47 75 59.6%
20 48 77 60.4%
30 51 82 60.8%
40 56 84 50%
50 58 85 46.6%
60 61 88 44.3%
70 63 90 42.9%
80 64 92 43.8%
90 64 92 43.8%
100 64 92 43.8%
Avg.= 49.6%
TABLE III
DELIVERY (SRLAR VS. SDLAR)
# of Nodes Delivery (SRLAR) Delivery (SDLAR) Enhancement
10 75 82 9.3%
20 77 86 11.7%
30 82 88 7.3%
40 84 92 9.5%
50 85 94 10.6%
60 88 96 9.1%
70 90 98 8.9%
80 92 99 7.6%
90 92 100 8.7%
100 92 100 8.7%
Avg.= 9.14%
TABLE IV
DELAY (SRLAR VS. SDLAR))
# of Nodes Delay (SRLAR) Delay (SDLAR) Enhancement
[ms] [ms]
10 27 24 11.1%
20 30 26 13.3%
30 34 28 17.6%
40 37 31 16.2%
50 40 33 17.5%
60 42 34 19%
70 43 35 18.6%
80 44 35 20.5%
90 44 35 20.5%
100 44 35 20.5%
Avg.= 17.48%
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Fig. 11. Effect of malicious nodes on secure data delivery. 40 vehicular nodes.
Node speed is 5 units/sec.
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Fig. 12. Effect of malicious nodes on average total packet delays. 40 vehicular
nodes. Node speed is 5 units/sec.
performs the secure RLAR, which makes it more suitable for
the VANET with security threats. Fig. 12 shows that the non-
secure protocols have less packets delay and is irrelevant to the
number of malicious nodes. This is because these protocols do
not have any security association phase which may lead to a
catastrophe when facing security threats.
TABLE V
DELIVERY (DLAR VS. SDLAR)
# of Mali- Delivery (DLAR) Delivery (SDLAR) Enhancement
cious Nodes
2 68 95 39.7%
4 63 92 46%
6 58 90 55.2%
8 56 88 57.1%
10 55 86 56.4%
12 55 86 56.4%
Avg.= 51.8%
The data are analyzed in the following tables to clarify
the simulation results on routing performances with different
numbers of malicious nodes in the VANET. Table V and
Table VI show that the secure DLAR outperforms the non-
secure DLAR in data delivery with an average 51.8% enhance-
ment and the secure RLAR outperforms the non-secure RLAR
with an average 51% enhancement. Table VII and Table VIII
compare the two secure LAR protocols regarding secure data
delivery and average total packet delay, respectively. The tables
show that, compared with the secure RLAR, the secure DLAR
enhances the secure data delivery by an average 11.8% and
reduces the packet delay by an average 16.3%.
D. Node Speed Effect
To show the effect of the node speed on the VANET
performance metrics, i.e., secure data delivery and average
packet delay, we simulate scenarios with the node speed
v = 5, 10, 15, 20, . . . , 40 units/sec. The number of vehicular
nodes in the VANET is 40, and the percentage of the malicious
nodes is 10%, i.e., 4 malicious nodes.
Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show that the higher speed at which
the nodes move, the less secure data delivery and the larger
average total packet delay there are in the VANET. This is
TABLE VI
DELIVERY (RLAR VS. SRLAR)
# of Mali- Delivery (RLAR) Delivery (SRLAR) Enhancement
cious Nodes
2 60 88 46.7%
4 56 84 50%
6 52 81 51.7%
8 51 77 55.8%
10 50 76 52%
12 50 75 50%
Avg.= 51%
TABLE VII
DELIVERY (SRLAR VS. SDLAR)
# of Mali- Delivery (SRLAR) Delivery (SDLAR) Enhancement
cious Nodes
2 88 95 8%
4 84 92 9.5%
6 81 90 11.1%
8 77 88 14.3%
10 76 86 13.2%
12 75 86 14.7%
Avg.= 11.8%
TABLE VIII
DELAY (SRLAR VS. SDLAR))
# of Mali- Delay (SRLAR) Delay (SDLAR) Enhancement
cious Nodes [ms] [ms]
2 33 27 18.2%
4 37 31 16.2%
6 42 35 16.7%
8 44 37 15.9%
10 45 38 15.6%
12 45 38 15.6%
Avg.= 16.3%
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Fig. 13. Effect of node speed on secure data delivery. 40 vehicular nodes.
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Fig. 14. Effect of node speed on average total packet delay. 40 vehicular
nodes. 10% malicious nodes.
because the high mobility leads to the frequent route discon-
nection. Therefore, the overhead is high of finding a stable
route from the source to the destination. The results show that
the proposed secure LAR provides better data delivery with
larger average total packet delay compared with the non-secure
LAR. And, the secure DLAR outperforms the secure RLAR
in data delivery and packet delay.
The performance of the VANET with different node speeds
is clarified in the following tables. Table IX and Table X show
that the secure LAR routing protocols outperform the non-
secure LAR routing protocols regarding secure data delivery
with different node speeds. The records in the tables show that
the secure DLAR outperforms the non-secure DLAR with an
average 65.5% and the secure RLAR outperforms the non-
secure RLAR with an average 60.9% in data delivery. Table XI
and Table XII compare the secure DLAR and the secure RLAR
regarding secure data delivery and average total packet delay,
respectively. It is revealed that using the secure DLAR has
an average 12.2% in enhanced data delivery and an average
14.4% in reduced packet delay.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Two secure location-aided routing (LAR) protocols are
proposed for the VANET. One routing protocol is based on
TABLE IX
DELIVERY (DLAR VS. SDLAR)
Node Speed Delivery (DLAR) Delivery (SDLAR) Enhancement
(units/sec)
5 63 92 46%
10 57 88 54.4%
15 53 85 60.4%
20 51 82 60.8%
25 48 81 68.8%
30 45 80 77.8%
35 45 80 77.8%
40 45 80 77.8%
Avg.= 65.5%
TABLE X
DELIVERY (RLAR VS. SRLAR)
Node Speed Delivery (RLAR) Delivery (SRLAR) Enhancement
(units/sec)
5 56 84 50%
10 52 81 55.8%
15 49 77 57.1%
20 47 73 55.3%
25 44 71 61.4%
30 42 70 66.7%
35 41 70 70.7%
40 41 70 70.7%
Avg.= 60.9%
TABLE XI
DELIVERY (SRLAR VS. SDLAR)
Node Speed Delivery (SRLAR) Delivery (SDLAR) Enhancement
(units/sec)
5 84 92 9.5%
10 81 88 8.6%
15 77 85 10.4%
20 73 82 12.3%
25 71 81 14.1%
30 70 80 14.3%
35 70 80 14.3%
40 70 80 14.3%
Avg.= 12.2%
TABLE XII
DELAY (SRLAR VS. SDLAR))
Node Speed Delay (SRLAR) Delay (SDLAR) Enhancement
(units/sec) [ms] [ms]
5 37 31 16.2%
10 42 35 16.7%
15 45 38 15.6%
20 49 42 14.3%
25 52 46 11.5%
30 56 49 12.5%
35 57 49 14%
40 57 49 14%
Avg.= 14.4%
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the request zone and the other on the distance to the desti-
nation node. The protocols use Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol with short authentication strings to establish secure
communication links between vehicular nodes through Wi-
Fi Direct. The VANET is therefore protected against secu-
rity threats such as the MITMA. Extensive simulations are
performed through the .Net framework to accommodate the
dynamic geographic routing features. With different network
densities, security threats and node speeds, simulation results
show that the proposed secure LAR methods improve secure
data delivery with a tradeoff in average total packet delay.
Of the two proposed secure LAR methods, the secure DLAR
outperforms the secure RLAR regarding both data delivery
and packet delay.
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